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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses Scalia’s contribution to a series of cases, spanning much 
of his thirty years tenure on the court, which addressed issues relating to 
sexual orientation discrimination. The argument put forward is that these 
cases severely undermine any claim that Scalia might make to having been a 
distinguished judge in an intellectual or juridical sense. The pervasive theme 
of Scalia’s opinions in these matters are those of a constant failure to respect 
traditional tenets of legal reasoning and a compulsive inclination to engage in 
abusive castigation both of the litigants challenging the discriminatory laws 
and his judicial colleagues who did not agree with his viewpoint. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
When Antonin Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986, the notion 
that Congress, the federal government or the States were constitutionally 
prohibited from imposing all sorts of discriminatory laws, policies and 
practices on non-heterosexual people solely because of those people’s sexual 
orientation would have struck most legally literate observers as fanciful if not 
absurd.1 There was by that time a groundswell of academic literature pressing 
such arguments through an extension of the privacy jurisprudence which had 
emerged in the 1960s to invalidate State proscription of contraception and 
been built on in Roe v. Wade and subsequent abortion judgments,2 and as well 
growing political pressures within some States to recognize sexual orientation 
as a legitimate classification for equality law purposes. But the fact that little 
more than thirty years later we seem to be arriving at a position in which a 
majority of the federal judiciary is reading the constitution in just such a 
                                                          
1
 Most notably in 1976, the Supreme Court had summarily upheld (425 U.S. 901 (1976)) a 2-
1 Court of Appeals judgment upholding Virginia's criminalization of male to male sexual 
relations; Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975). On the state of the 
law on this issue up to the late 1970s see especially Rhonda Rivera, Our Straight-Laced 
Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 
799 (1978-1979). 
 
2
 See e.g. David A.J. Richards, Homosexuality and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, N.Y. 
U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311 (1979); Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to 
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 
957 (1978-1979). 
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prohibitory way offers a remarkable illustration of the rapidity with which 
supposedly fundamental moral principles within United States society can 
evolve and change.  
It is hardly a revelation to note that Justice Scalia saw few 
constitutional barriers to such discriminatory treatment, whether in federal or 
state law. Scalia sat in a cluster of notable cases involving sexual orientation 
discrimination while he served on the Supreme Court, running from Hurley v. 
Irish American Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston Inc.3 in 1995 
through to Obergefell v. Hodges4 in 2015. This paper assesses the judgments 
offered or joined by Justice Scalia in six of those cases.5 My primary interest 
is to use this issue as a vehicle to explore the hypothesis that Scalia, whatever 
his personal political ideologies, was nonetheless a distinguished judge – even 
perhaps a great one – in a purely juridic and intellectual sense.6 In short 
terms, the argument presented here is that any such portrayal is quite 
unsustainable. While one can find sound doctrinal (or if one prefers 
constitutional) reasons to support the substantive conclusions that he 
defended in these cases, Scalia himself did a poor job of building and 
presenting his arguments. This failing lies in part in matters of intellectual 
rigor and/or honesty: Scalia’s opinions repeatedly mischaracterized the 
positions adopted by members of the court with whom he disagreed and 
invoked quite absurd analogies to sustain his own. It also lies in Scalia’s 
repeatedly derogatory, almost demonizing portrayal, of the litigants and 
organizations seeking to promote the cause of sexual orientation equality. All 
in all, his opinions offer a most unappetizing constitutional dish. 
 
 
A Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 
 
                                                          
3515 U.S. 557 (1995). The court was Rehnquist, C.J. (Nixon/Reagan 1972/1986), Stevens 
(Ford 1975), O’Connor (Reagan 1981), Scalia (Reagan 1986), Kennedy (Reagan 1988), 
Souter (Bush 1990), Thomas (Bush 1991), Ginsburg (Clinton 1993, and Breyer (Clinton 
1994).  
 
4
 576 (U.S.), 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
5
 The list is not exhaustive. For a much more thorough analysis of the first half of Scalia’s 
tenure on the Court see JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE (2002). 
6
 Such comments came predictably, from right-leaning blogs and magazines; see e.g. Mark 
Joseph Stern, Antonin Scalia Will Be Remembered as One of the Greats, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/antonin_scalia_was_
a_truly_great_supreme_court_justice.html, SLATE, (Feb.13 2016 8.44 PM); Jeffrey Rosen, 
What Made Scalia Great (2016) THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2016) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/what-made-antonin-scalia-
great/462837/. They also came from legal academics who one might think ought to know 
better, e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, The Scalia I Knew Will Be Greatly Missed (2016) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-14/the-scalia-i-knew-will-be-greatly-
missed, and even from President Obama: ‘Barack Obama praised Scalia as a “brilliant legal 
mind” who was “one of the towering legal figures of our time” and “one of the most 
consequential judges and thinkers to serve on the supreme court”.’; 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/feb/13/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dead-at-
79. 
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Bowers v. Hardwick7 was of course decided shortly before Scalia was 
appointed to the Supreme Court. Scalia’s confirmation hearings were held on 
August 5 and 6 that year.8 Bowers had been argued on March 31, and 
judgment was handed down on June 30.  Scalia had made it clear at the outset 
of the hearing that he would not answer questions on specific Supreme Court 
decisions,9 which may be why Bowers was not raised expressly. The nearest 
that the Senate came to the case was a question from Joe Biden: 
 
Senator BIDEN.  Do you believe that there is such a thing as a 
constitutional right to privacy, not delineating whether, for example, 
the right to terminate a pregnancy relates to the right to privacy or the 
right to engage in homosexual activities in your home is a right to 
privacy, or the right to use contraceptives in your home is a right—
but, in a philosophic sense, is there such a thing as a constitutionally 
protected right to privacy? 
 
Judge SCALIA. I don't think I could answer that, Senator, without 
violating the line I've tried to hold. 10 
 
Bowers was a profoundly contentious decision both within the Court and 
outside it.11 The bench was split 5-4. Justice White delivered the majority 
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and 
O’Connor;12 the dissenters were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and 
Stevens.13 The case is a powerful illustration both of the way that the ratio of 
a judgment can be misrepresented by the court that makes it and of the way 
that the misrepresentation takes hold both in legal and popular consciousness.  
 
The easy assumption is that the ratio of Bowers is that a State was entitled to 
attach even quite severe criminal sanctions to adults who consensually 
engaged in private in homosexual sexual activities. However, the Georgia 
statute at issue in Bowers criminalized various sexual practices irrespective of 
                                                          
7
 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 
8
 A transcript of the confirmation hearings is available at https://www.congress.gov/supreme-
court/GPO-CHRG-SCALIA.pdf. 
 
9
 Id. at 33. 
10
 Id. at 102. 
 
11
 For a variety of perspectives see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE SODOMY CASES: BOWERS V. 
HARDWICK AND LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2009): Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason, VA,. L. 
REV. 1805 (1993): Randi Maurer, Bowers v. Hardwick: A Giant Step Backwards for Privacy 
RIGHTS, LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1013 (1987): Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 N.C.  L. REV. 359 (2001). For a kaleidoscopic set of views on one convenient 
location see  the collection of essays in 79 VA L.R. 1419  (1993). 
 
12
 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell filed concurring opinions. 
 
13
 Brennan (Eisenhower 1956), White (Kennedy 1962), Marshall (Johnson 1967), Burger 
(Nixon 1969) Blackmun (Nixon, 1970), Rehnquist (Nixon 1972), Powell (Nixon 1972), 
Stevens (Ford 1975), and O’Connor (Reagan 1981).  
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the sexual orientation of the participants. The clause in issue (Georgia Code 
Ann. §16-6-2 (1984) provided simply that: “(a) A person commits the offence 
of sodomy when he [or she] performs or submits to any sexual act involving 
the sex organs of one person and the mouth of anus of another”. It was 
therefore entirely possible for heterosexuals to commit ‘sodomy’ with each 
other under Georgia law whether through anal (whether penetrative or not) or 
oral sex. While Mr. Hardwick was gay, and was obviously concerned to 
establish that Georgia could not prevent him having sex with other men, his 
suit was argued on the basis that consensual private sexual activity between 
adults was a privacy interest that States could restrict only through laws that 
could withstand strict scrutiny analysis. On that basis, Mr. Hardwick had been 
successful before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.14 This was 
also how the case was characterized by Justice Blackmun for the dissenters:15 
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante 
at 478 U. S. 191, than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 
(1969), was about a fundamental right to watch obscene 
movies, or Katz v. U.S., 389 U. S. 347 (1967), was about a 
fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone 
booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, 
"the right to be let alone." Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U. S. 438, 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 Justice White’s majority opinion however presented the question in much 
narrower terms: 
 
The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers 
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy….16 
[R]espondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals 
did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 
This we are quite unwilling to do.17 
 
Having defined the question in that way, Justice White was able to conclude 
that none of the by then long and eclectic line of privacy-liberty case law18 
                                                          
14
 760 F 2d. 1202 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 
15
 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986). 
 
16
 Justice White presumably meant this to read ‘to engage with other homosexuals in sodomy 
as defined in Georgia law. Whether Georgia could proscribe ‘sodomy’ by a bisexual man 
with a woman (whatever her sexual orientation) was a question apparently beyond the 
majority’s imagination. 
 
17
 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
 
18
 On inter alia, schooling and educ. Meyer v. Nebraska,, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925): sterilization, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U
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had any bearing on the issue. The matter was easily resolved. Since ‘sodomy’ 
had long been regarded as a crime in the USA (and was criminal in all States 
until 1961)19 it could not possibly be regarded as a fundamental right in the 
senses envisaged in Palko v. Connecticut, i.e. that it was ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed’;20 or, more helpfully as a guideline, per Powell, J. in 
Moore v. East Cleveland: “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”21 
 
The majority judgment is very cursory. It certainly makes clear that 
there is no need for the Court to subject Georgia law to strict scrutiny, and 
rather suggests that even if the law were subject to rational basis review no 
argument could be made against its constitutionality:22 
 
[R]espondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the 
law, and that there is none in this case other than the 
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is 
said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law. The law, 
however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all 
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be 
very busy indeed… . Even respondent makes no such claim, 
but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of 
homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not 
agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 
States should be invalidated on this basis. 
 
The majority in effect upheld a State law other than the one before it. But in 
doing so the majority confirmed that it was constitutionally quite acceptable 
for a political majority in a State to attach severe sanctions to homosexual 
behavior, for no reason other than that the majority found homosexuality 
morally distasteful, so long as that majority sentiment was shared and had 
been given legal effect by many other State majorities.23 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
(1942): and contraception and abortion Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
19
 Justice White lists the various laws, but does not explore what ‘sodomy’ meant in each of 
them, or whether such laws proscribed just homosexual activity or included heterosexual 
behavior as well. 
 
20
 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937). 
 
21
 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977). 
 
22
 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).  
 
23
 For a fascinating ‘inside’ view of the dynamics of the decision-making process in Bowers, 
and especially the role of Justice Powell, see MURDOCH & PRICE, supra  note 5, at chs. 12-13. 
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The dissenting view rested on the premise that the Georgia law 
interfered not with a right to homosexual sodomy, but with: “the fundamental 
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate 
associations with others.”24 Justice Blackmun was equivocal as to whether the 
law should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny or rational basis review, but 
indicated that the question was not relevant because the law would not pass 
even rational basis scrutiny if the only evidentially credible basis advanced 
for its enactment was majoritarian disapproval (what he termed ‘animus’) 
towards homosexuals: 
 
This case involves no real interference with the rights of 
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not 
adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable 
interest, cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 476 U. S. 65-
66 (1986), let alone an interest that can justify invading the 
houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live 
their lives differently.25 
 
While the majority judgment affirmed the constitutionality of 
legislation criminalizing gay sexual activity, in the years immediately 
following Bowers the legislative trend was firmly towards more widespread 
decriminalization. Almost twenty years were to pass before Bowers was 
squarely revisited by the Court. In the interim, three further sexual orientation 
cases, all involving civil rather than criminal law issues, received the Court’s 
attention.  
 
B Hurley v. Irish American Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston Inc. (1995)  
 
Justice Scalia was a silent adherent to a unanimous court opinion in Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston Inc.26  The issue 
presented in Hurley revolved around the efforts of the Respondent (referred to 
in the judgment as GLIB) to participate as a group in Boston’s annual St. 
Patrick’s Day Parade. The parade had grown by the 1990s into a major 
cultural event, rooted in celebration in part of the Irish roots of many of 
Boston’s residents and in part of the evacuation of British troops from the city 
during the war of independence. Although the event had initially been run by 
the city itself, since 1947 the parade had been organized – with a city license 
– by the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (hereafter referred to as 
the Veterans Council).  
                                                          
24
 Id. at 206. 
 
25
 Id. at 213. 
 
26
 515 U.S. 557 (1995). The court was Rehnquist, C.J. (Nixon/Reagan 1972/1986), Stevens 
(Ford 1975), O’Connor (Reagan 1981), Scalia (Reagan 1986), Kennedy (Reagan 1988) 
Souter (Bush 1990), Thomas (Bush 1991), Ginsburg (Clinton 1993), and Breyer (Clinton 
1994), JJ. On the positions of the individual Justices prior to the judgment being written see 
MURDOCH & PRICE, supra  note 5, at 428-34.  
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The Veterans Council had refused to allow GLIB to march in the 
parade. GLIB then sued the Veterans Council under the Massachusetts public 
accommodations law, which prohibited: “[A]ny distinction, discrimination or 
restriction on account of [specified criteria] relative to the admission of any 
person to or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or 
amusement”.27 That legislation dated from 1865, and was initially targeted 
only at race discrimination. Its scope however had been incrementally 
extended, and sexual orientation discrimination was added in 1989 during the 
Governorship of Michael Dukakis.28 The law was accepted to be applicable 
both to public sector bodies and to private sector individuals or organizations 
if they provided ‘public accommodation…’. The Massachusetts courts 
concluded that the Veteran Council’s refusal did amount to a breach of the 
public accommodation laws (it not being contested that the parade was a 
‘public accommodation’ or ‘amusement’ within the statute) and granted 
GLIB injunctive relief requiring the Veterans Council to allow GLIB to join 
the parade.29 
 
Rather curiously, on the Veteran Council’s appeal to the Supreme 
Court, GLIB did not argue the case on the basis that the Veterans Council’s 
activities amounted to state action (through the license granted by the city) 
under the Fourteenth Amendment,30 which would have opened the door to the 
assertion that the liberty and equal protection interests of GLIB’s members 
were being infringed by the city’s failure to make GLIB’s participation in the 
parade a term of the license.31 This had the possibly unhappy consequence 
that the case was effectively argued on the basis that the Massachusetts’ 
courts’ use of the public accommodation law infringed the liberty interests of 
the Veteran’s Council under the First Amendment. 
 
The Supreme Court also proceeded on the basis that – as a matter of 
fact – the Veterans Council did not and would not exclude any individual 
from the parade because of her sexual orientation;32 the exclusion was rather 
of GLIB, a collectivity; and exclusion was not imposed because of GLIB’s 
members’ sexual orientation per se, but because of the message that GLIB’s 
participation in the parade would communicate to other participants in and 
watchers of the parade. This characterization of the issue fed directly and 
                                                          
27
 Mass. Gen. Laws s.272.98 (1992); 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter272/Section98. 
 
28
 http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/01/us/a-gay-rights-law-is-voted-in-massachusetts.html. 
29
 Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston, 418 Mass. 238, 
636 N.E. 2d 1293 (Mass. 1994). 
 
30
 The point had been raised and lost in the trial court. The argument would have been a 
strong one in the light of such authorities as Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Jones v. 
Mayer; 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
 
31
 Essentially the argument successfully made in respect of a challenge to racial 
discrimination by a nominally private body in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 366 U.S. 
715 (1961). 
 
32
 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). 
 
(2017) British Journal of American Legal Studies 
 
8 
 
smoothly into a clearly established tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence; 
namely that freedom of expression (and no sensible case could be made that 
the parade was not expressive activity) necessarily entails a freedom to 
disassociate oneself from expression that one does not wish to endorse. The 
Court formed no view on the reason underlying the Veteran Council’s 
decision to exclude GLIB, but saw no need to do so: “…[W]hatever the 
reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular 
point of view, and that choice is presumed to be beyond the government’s 
power to control”.33 
 
Whether (some members of) the Court designedly obscured or 
displaced the sexual orientation discrimination dimension of Hurley is a 
matter for speculation. But the case was decided in a political context within 
which an increasing number of States (or of municipal governments within 
them) were beginning to proscribe and/or restrict various manifestations of 
such discrimination.34 Hurley raised an obvious First Amendment cloud over 
the extent of the constitutionality of such initiatives.35 Unsurprisingly 
however, in a political landscape as variegated as that of the United States, it 
was not long before such actions were met by a reaction which provided the 
Court – and Justice Scalia – with the opportunity to confront the question 
more directly. 
 
 
C Romer v. Evans (1996)  
 
The Court, although its composition was unchanged, could not maintain a 
united front just a year after Hurley when delivering judgment in Romer v. 
Evans.36 Justices Kennedy, Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. 
joined in a decision invalidating a recent amendment to the Colorado 
constitution, over a Scalia-authored dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
and Justice Thomas. 
 
In a nice illustration of the often fragmented nature of the 
governmental system in the United States, the titular ‘defendant’ in the case 
was Roy Romer, the then (Democrat) Governor of Colorado. Romer found 
himself defending the constitutionality of a state constitutional provision 
                                                          
33
 515 U.S. 557, 575 (1995). 
 
34
 See MURDOCH & PRICE, supra  note 5, at ch. 16. 
 
35
 The Veterans Council did not expressly root its arguments in the freedom of religion clause 
of the First Amendment, but the possibility of deploying such arguments to attack state law 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination laws was well established by that time; see for 
example Lucien Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes and Sexual Orientation: Should 
There Be a Religious Exemption for Secular Businesses?, WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & THE 
LAW 319 (2105). 
 
36
 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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which he had opposed and campaigned against prior to its adoption. The 
provision, known as ‘Amendment 2’ was adopted in 1992.37 It read: 
 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or 
Bisexual Orientation.  
 
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or 
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, 
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce 
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby 
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices 
or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or 
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any 
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of 
discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all 
respects self-executing.38 
 
Amendment 2 was subject to injunctive litigation in the state courts 
before it came into effect. Richard Evans, a gay man, was the lead plaintiff in 
the action, although he was joined by a variety of other individuals, pressure 
groups and local municipalities.39 The Colorado Supreme Court was invited 
to accept that sexual orientation was a suspect category under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause,40 to subject Amendment 2 to strict 
scrutiny and to find that the Amendment could not pass the test. Although the 
Court took the latter two steps, it reached them not through equal protection 
analysis but by holding that Amendment 2 breached a ‘fundamental right’ of 
gay people. The court’s reasoning was that if Amendment 2 was effective, 
gay people could only gain the protection of anti-sexual orientation 
discrimination by securing a further amendment to the State Constitution. All 
other groups could gain protection vis-à-vis their own particular defining 
characteristics through state legislation, or via local government by-laws, or 
by alterations to government agencies’ policies. The Supreme Court was 
                                                          
37
 Colorado uses the initiative device for constitutional reform (Constitution Art V s. 1; 
http://tornado.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/olls/constitution.htm#ARTICLE_V_Section_1;.  A 
simple majority of votes cast in favor of the proposed amendment is all that is required. In the 
amendment 2 ballot, the majority in favor was 813,000 to 710,000. See Stephen Zamansky, 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 and Homosexuals’ Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 
BOSTON COL. L. REV. 221 (1993); MURDOCH & PRICE, supra  note 5, at ch. 16. 
38
 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
 
39
 Denver, Boulder and Aspen (all liberal enclaves within the State) had already enacted anti-
sexual orientation discrimination ordinances. Amendment 2 was in part a backlash from the 
conservative heartlands of Colorado against such metropolitan cultural initiatives. See Jean 
Hardisty, Constructing Homophobia: Colorado’s Right Wing Attack on Homosexuals, 
PUBLIC EYE (1993) (archived at http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v07n1/conshomo.html. 
 
40
 For an analysis of the state of equal protection jurisprudence at this time see especially, 
Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly 
or Otherwise, TEMPLE L. REV. 937 (1991). 
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notably unimpressed by the arguments advanced by the State to justify the 
Amendment, these being variously the need to protect the religious freedom 
of service providers whose religious beliefs required them to refuse service to 
gay people, the need not to undermine the views expressed by parents 
disapproving of homosexuality to their children, the need to protect the 
privacy interests of people who did not wish to associate with homosexuals 
and finally, the need to respect the wishes of the electoral majority.41 
 
The case was taken on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 
being argued in October 1995 and decided in May 1996. The Colorado 
Supreme Court’s judgment was upheld by a 6 (Kennedy, Stevens. O’Connor, 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J.) to 3 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, 
J.J.) majority. The majority upheld the Colorado Supreme Court's decision 
that Amendment 2’s requirement that non-heterosexuals had to seek through 
constitutional amendment what all other groups could achieve through 
ordinary legislative or governmental processes was properly seen as 
infringing upon a ‘fundamental right’. The conclusion seemed however to rest 
at least implicitly on a suggestion that sexual orientation should be recognized 
as a suspect category – and so a trigger for strict scrutiny – for equal 
protection purposes. Formally however, the majority view on the equal 
protection question was that Amendment 2 could not even pass rational basis 
scrutiny because it amounted in essence to a majoritarian attempt to 
stigmatize and disfavor a specific group. The majority invoked the decision in 
Dep’t. of Agriculture v. Moreno42 to sustain this point: 
[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare … 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.43  
At its core, Kennedy’s opinion appeared to assert that a State had no 
constitutional capacity to allow its citizens to manifest in law their ill-will or 
bigotry toward a clearly defined sub-group, irrespective of how many of the 
State’s citizens endorsed that particular point of view. 
 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the dissenters might be thought at its 
strongest when it takes the majority to task for its failure to engage at all with 
Bowers. The gist of the critique would seem to be that Bowers manifestly 
permits State majorities to ‘harm’ gay people by criminalizing their 
consensual, private, sexual conduct, and so the majority conclusion in Romer 
could only be correct if Bowers was wrongly decided. While this would be an 
obviously forceful doctrinal point if that is what the issue actually was before 
the Bowers Court, the critique is of course premised on a lie (it is hard to 
believe it is a misunderstanding), since the Georgia law under assessment in 
                                                          
41
 See Ian Loveland, A Fundamental Right to Be Gay Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
PUBLIC LAW 601 (1996). 
42
 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 
43
 Romer, 517 U.S. 623, 634 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. 534) (emphasis in original). 
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Bowers applied (at least on its face) as readily to heterosexual as to 
homosexual sexual practices. One might have thought a judge as 
intellectually rigorous as Scalia, J. was supposed to be would have noted this 
flaw in the Bowers majority opinion, but it seemed to pass him by. This 
endorsement of an essentially mendacious majority judgment is however, 
perhaps the intellectual high point of his dissent in Romer v. Evans. 
 
Initially one might think Scalia is on firmer ground when he makes 
the observation that several States have rendered polygamy unlawful except 
through the mechanism of constitutional amendment.44 This, Scalia suggests, 
manifests just the same kind of majority disapproval of particular sexual 
mores as is pursued by Amendment 2. The analogy is plainly a silly one, as 
polygamy is a question of social choice (at least for the men) rather than, as is 
sexual orientation, an innate characteristic.45 Absurd analogies abound 
however in Scalia’s judgment, presumably because he cannot or will not 
accept that a person’s sexual orientation is not simply a matter of choice. In 
the following passage for example, Scalia combines an attack on the majority 
for suggesting that there is something mean-spirited about the sentiments 
underlying Article 2 with a casual equation of same sex marriage to murder 
and animal cruelty: 
 
The Court's opinion contains grim, disapproving hints that 
Coloradans have been guilty of "animus" or "animosity" 
toward homosexuality, as though that has been established as 
un-American. Of course it is our moral heritage that one 
should not hate any human being or class of human beings. 
But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct 
reprehensible-murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to 
animals-and could exhibit even “animus” toward such 
conduct. Surely that is the only sort of “animus” at issue here: 
moral disapproval of homosexual conduct.46 
 
That Scalia can equate a person’s consensual sexual activities with 
committing murder is better described as unhinged than unsound. The 
comparison with animal cruelty is of similar quality, if of lesser degree, and 
the inapposite nature of the homosexuality/polygamy analogy has already 
been noted. 
 
A subsequent passage is striking more for its constitutional illiteracy 
than its logical shortcomings. In criticizing the majority view that subjecting 
gay people to an atypically onerous lawmaking process is constitutionally 
objectionable, Scalia offers the following proposition:  
                                                          
44
 Id. at 649. 
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What the Court says is even demonstrably false at the 
constitutional level. The Eighteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution, for example, deprived those who drank 
alcohol not only of the power to alter the policy of prohibition 
locally or through state legislation, but even of the power to 
alter it through state constitutional amendment or federal 
legislation. The Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment prevents theocrats from having their way by 
converting their fellow citizens at the local, state, or federal 
statutory level; as does the Republican Form of Government 
Clause prevent monarchists.47 
 This is a remarkably silly observation. It ignores of course the rather basic 
point that while the Colorado Constitution is subject to the limits of the 
national Constitution, the national Constitution is a legal construct of 
unlimited competence. No provision of the Constitution can be argued to be 
unconstitutional. 
 
While Scalia castigates the majority for assuming that the people who 
voted for Amendment 2 were motivated by animus towards homosexuality, 
he does not trouble himself to offer any evidenced explanation of just what 
that motivation was. Nor does Scalia bother to disguise his own clear 
‘animus’ towards homosexuality, which rather suggests that if he had even 
addressed the point that his judicial role would require him to cast aside his 
own cultural opinions while forming his judgment he had decided there was 
no need to do so. The comparison of homosexuality to murder was remarked 
upon above. In a similarly derogatory vein, when touching upon the issue of 
welfare support for widowed spouses, Scalia equates the ‘“life partner”’ 
(Scalia J.’s “…”) of a gay person with a heterosexual person’s ‘long time 
roommate’. The “…” themselves betoken an obvious distaste for same-sex 
coupledom, while the suggestion that such a couple are in an analogous 
position to ‘room-mates’ is a manifest belittling of gay relationships. The use 
of “….” as a means to connote disdain for the litigants also appears whenever 
Scalia mentions the notion of sexual “orientation”, something which he seems 
to equate with what he later refers to – again in “…” - as an “alternative life 
style”.48 
 
Matters of style shade back as well into questions of substance. Scalia 
devotes much of his judgment to asserting that the only effect of Amendment 
2 is to make it harder for gay people to gain ‘preferential treatment’.49 
Assuming the comment to be bona fide, the proposition is quite extraordinary. 
In what way is one afforded ‘preferential’ or ‘special’ treatment’ by a State 
law or municipal ordinance which provides that one’s sexual orientation 
                                                          
47
 Id. at 648. 
48
 Repeatedly, but not exclusively, at 517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996). The alternative life style 
label is at 645. 
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(without the “….”) is per se a justification for, inter alia, being sacked from a 
job or refused access to a local sports facility?  
 
Scalia’s major concern however seems to be that the Court is faced 
with a conspiracy between the unholy alliance of an unrepresentative lawyer 
elite which is improperly sympathetic to sexual orientation equality, and a 
disproportionately powerful gay mafia:50 
 
The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to retain 
social disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, because those 
who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in 
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, see Record, 
Exh. MMM, have high disposable income, see ibid.; App. 254 
(affidavit of Prof. James Hunter), and, of course, care about 
homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public 
at large, they possess political power much greater than their 
numbers, both locally and statewide.51 
 
All in all, the dissent is not very impressive stuff. 
 
 
D Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) 
 
Scalia merely assented to the majority judgment in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale 52 five years later. The case had a superficial resemblance to Hurley, in 
that the Boy Scouts had been successfully sued under New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law (which as in Massachusetts prohibited sexual 
orientation discrimination) by a gay man who had been dismissed from his 
position as an Assistant Scoutmaster because he was homosexual. While the 
more cynical and salacious observer might surmise that a fair few 
homosexually-inclined men in the United States of the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s kept firmly locked in their closets same-sex sexual experiences they 
encountered in the embrace (metaphorical and literal) of the Boy Scouts of 
America, the organization itself showed no inclination to publicize such 
activities. Indeed, the Boy Scouts of America had apparently been concerned 
about the implications of sexual orientation equality for some years, and had 
indeed filed an amicus curiae brief before the Supreme Court in Hurley 
urging reversal of the state court decision.53 
 
                                                          
50
 He is appalled for example that most law schools do not permits sexual orientation 
discrimination in their hiring policy, even though – once again grasping for the absurd – it is 
apparently acceptable for them not to hire someone because inter alia he [sic] ‘eats snails’; Id. 
at 652-53. 
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 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644-45 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Mr. Dale had by all accounts been an extremely successful scout. His 
difficulties with the organization began when, having moved on to university 
he came out not just to his family and friends but to the wider public by 
involving himself in various gay-rights lobbying activities. This evidently 
came to the attention of the Boy Scouts of America, which promptly expelled 
him from the organization. The New Jersey courts, undeterred it seems by 
Hurley, found in Mr. Dale’s favor. 
 
The Supreme Court, unchanged in composition since Romer v. Evans 
changed its alignment in Dale, with Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joining 
the Romer dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas) to overturn the State courts decision, with Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting. 
 
The majority saw no difference between the issues before the Court in 
Hurley and Dale. The crux of the Boy Scouts’ case was that Mr. Dale’s 
continued membership of the organization would run counter to the message 
that the Boy Scouts wished to communicate to their own members and the 
world at large about the organization’s view of homosexuality: 
 
The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent 
with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, 
particularly with the values represented by the terms “morally 
straight” and “clean”.54 
 
Requiring the Boy Scouts to retain Mr. Dale as a member would compromise 
the clarity of this message, and thus fell foul of the Boy Scouts’ First 
Amendment entitlements vis-à-vis the State. 
 
The dissenters drew a bright line between the Hurley and Dale factual 
scenarios. The parade in issue on Hurley was seen as an inherently and 
entirely expressive activity. Insofar as the Boy Scouts promulgated a view on 
homosexuality however, (and the dissenters were not convinced that the 
organization had ever clearly put forward any such view), Mr. Dale’s 
membership did nothing to propagate a competing perspective:  
 
Dale’s inclusion in the Boy Scouts is nothing like the case in 
Hurley. His participation sends no cognizable message to the 
Scouts or to the world. Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a 
banner or a sign; he did not distribute any factsheet; and he 
expressed no intent to send any message. If there is any kind of 
message being sent, then, it is by the mere act of joining the 
Boy Scouts. Such an act does not constitute an instance of 
symbolic speech under the First Amendment.55 
 
                                                          
54
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The judgment in Dale held back legislative attempts to advance the political 
cause of sexual orientation equality. Scalia, such an advocate of political 
majoritarianism in Romer, was notably quiet – indeed wholly invisible – in 
respect of that position in Dale. That silence may perhaps be explained in a 
principled way by the overt presence of First Amendment issues in Dale 
which did not feature in Romer. Just three years later, finding himself in the 
minority, he had no compunction in reasserting his Romer viewpoints in even 
more strident terms. 
 
 
E Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
 
One might instinctively think there is something problematic about a 
constitutional order resting on deeply entrenched moral norms in which the 
final appellate court can hold that within the space of twenty years a previous 
judgment on an important issue can and should be overturned. Such a state of 
affairs might suggest a distinct lack of certainty in the constitution’s content. 
Concerns of that sort would obviously be mitigated as a matter of practicality 
if such reversals occurred very infrequently. And as a matter of doctrine one 
might think that the concern should be further attenuated if the previous 
judgment is reversed not because it is wrong now; but that it was wrong when 
it was decided.56 But that was just the position taken by the Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas57 in 2003 in respect of its (not very much earlier) 
judgment in Bowers. 58 
 
The bench in Lawrence, as in Dale, remained the same as in Romer 
seven years earlier. The majority in Lawrence consisted of Justice Kennedy, 
J. (authoring the opinion), joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and 
Breyer, with Justice O’Connor concurring in the result. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas joined Scalia in dissent. The Court’s 
membership had however changed markedly from its composition in Bowers. 
Among the Bowers majority, White, Burger and Powell had gone, as had 
Brennan, Blackman and Marshall among the dissenters. Only Stevens (a 
dissenter), and Rehnquist and O’Connor (for the majority) remained. 
 
  The adherents to Kennedy’s opinion followed the methodology of 
Justice Blackmun‘s dissent in Bowers. That case, like this one, was not about 
sodomy, whether homosexual or otherwise: 
 
That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court's own 
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that 
the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain 
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sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, 
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said 
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. 
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes 
that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. 
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching 
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The 
statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether 
or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as 
criminals.59 
 
Having criticized the Bowers majority for ‘misapprehending’ the nature of the 
liberty entitlement before it, Justice Kennedy also took issue with its 
contention that homosexual sexual relations had been criminalized for many 
years by many of the States. Kennedy’s reading of history was that no State 
had criminalized such activities until the 1970s, and since then only nine had 
done so. Nor was there evidence to support the proposition that the tiny 
number of reported prosecutions for sodomy en masse from the nineteenth 
century onwards contained a significant proportion of same sex, consensual 
participants. 
 
The Lawrence majority also criticized its Bowers predecessor for 
paying no attention to the fact the European Court of Human Rights in 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom60 had held that the criminalization of consensual 
homosexual activities between adults was incompatible with the Convention, 
suggesting that this was a helpful indicator (but surely no more that) as to the 
constitutionality of criminalizing such behavior. In narrow doctrinal terms, 
however, the Lawrence majority derived most assistance from two post-
Bowers authorities. The first, obviously, was its recent judgment in Romer. 
The second, rather more tenuous in its relevance to Bowers, was the abortion 
judgment in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,61 
which was invoked to underscore the point that such issues were connected 
by a more abstract constitutional principle: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
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Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.62 
Justice O’Connor, while concurring in the result, based her judgment on the 
Equal Protection Clause because the Texas statute, unlike the Georgia law 
challenged in Bowers, applied only to homosexual conduct. She did not go so 
far as to accept that sexual orientation was a suspect category for equal 
protection purposes, in which event state law would be subject to strict 
scrutiny rather than rational basis review.63 
 
Scalia had not set the intellectual bar for dissenting judgments very 
high in Romer, but it is safe to say that he did not clear it in Lawrence. While 
his opinion identifies several weaknesses in the reasoning of both Justices 
Kennedy and O’Connor, it is overall a splenetic rant more suited to a locker 
room than a court. 
 
The judgment begins with an implicit demonization of the litigants 
who have had the apparent temerity to challenge the rectitude of the Bowers 
majority’s opinion, casting them as having: “engaged in a seventeen year 
crusade”64 to have Bowers overturned. But Scalia also broadens the targets 
for abusive rhetoric beyond those singled out in Romer. The new bête noir 
that appears in Lawrence is ‘foreign law’ and especially the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon which Scalia denounces as a 
“foreign mood, fad or fashion.”65 
 
As the opinion proceeds, Scalia continues to indulge his fondness for 
inappropriate metaphor. While he no longer brackets gay sex with murder, he 
does portray it in the same light for the purposes of majoritarian proscription 
as, inter alia, “prostitution” and “recreational use of heroin”, “adult incest” 
and “obscenity” and “child pornography” and “bestiality.”66 
 
Nor, he contends, could any credible argument be made that such laws 
are empirically redundant or obsolete. Scalia notes that he has uncovered: 
“203 prosecutions for consensual adult homosexual sodomy reported…from 
the years 1880-1995.”67 Quite why Scalia sees this as a powerful rebuttal to 
the suggestion of the law’s practical obsolescence is a mystery. 203 
prosecutions is an average of fewer than 2 per year. In 1995, the population of 
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the United States was 266.3 million people. Obviously the population was 
much smaller in 1880, but even then it comprised 50.2 million people. 
Assuming even as few as 2% of the then population engaged in same sex 
sodomy just once a month (one cliché or demonization that Scalia does spare 
us is that gay people have sex more often than straights), those 203 
prosecutions (Scalia does not tell us how many of those led to convictions) 
are in quantitative terms of infinitesimally minimal significance. 
 
Scalia then matches ludicrous metaphor with ludicrous hyperbole in a 
cringeful echo of his opinion in Romer: 
 
This effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation. If, as 
the court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality 
is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above 
mentioned laws [inter alia prostitution, adult incest and child 
pornography] can survive rational basis review.68 
 
That there are many ways of ‘promoting’ majoritarian sexual morality 
that do not entail criminalizing people whose sexual preferences do not 
follow majoritarian tastes is a point on which Scalia does not dwell. His main 
concern however appears to be the implications that the majority opinion has 
for the States’ capacity to prohibit same-sex marriage: 
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law 
that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual 
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in 
marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual 
conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for purposes of 
proscribing that conduct, ante, at 18; and if, as the Court coos 
(casting aside all pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring,” ante, at 6; what justification could there possibly be 
for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples 
exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution,” ibid.? 
Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile 
and the elderly are allowed to marry.69 
Scalia’s views on that specific issue are entertainingly revealed in an account 
of a moot he judged at NYU law school in 1996.70 Suffice it to say that he did 
not appear receptive to the suggestion that either the liberty or equal 
protection dimensions of the Fourteenth Amendment could preclude States 
from forbidding same sex marriage. He would have wait over ten years 
however to take those views from the pretend courtroom to the real one. 
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F United States v. Windsor (2013) 
 
The specific target of the litigation in U.S. v. Windsor71 was s.3 of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (1996) (hereafter ‘DOMA’). S.3 was an 
interpretation clause, which provided: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ 
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person 
of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife”. 
 
S.3 was intended to apply to all federal measures in which marriage was a 
relevant criterion. It was presumably designed to disqualify same sex spouses 
from receiving any benefits or other favorable treatment which Congress 
granted to married couples. No States actually recognized same sex marriage 
at that time, and the Act appeared to be a pre-emptive strike lest any State (or 
perhaps Canada) should do so in future. The bill had been approved by 342–
67 in the House, and by 85-14 in the Senate.72 That it was then signed rather 
than vetoed by the President may surprise observers with an inaccurately 
rose-tinted view of Bill Clinton’s liberal political credentials. The bill passed 
through Congress shortly before the 1996 presidential elections; Clinton was 
evidently worried that rejecting it would lose him more votes than signing it 
would win.73 
 
The bill’s proponents in Congress were manifestly motivated by the 
animus (homophobic bigotry is perhaps the more apt descriptor) which had 
escaped Scalia’s attention in Romer and Lawrence. Its sponsor in the house, 
Bill Barr (Republican Georgia), told his colleagues that the United States was 
in dire peril from the onward march of the gays: 
 
The very foundations of our society are in danger of being 
burned…..The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the 
flames of self-centered morality are licking at the very 
foundation of our society: the family unit.74 
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Congressman Funderbunk (Republican North Carolina) had apparently not 
anticipated the judgment in Dale, for he was terribly concerned about the fate 
of the Boy Scouts of America, who were apparently: “being told to abandon 
their moral code of 80 years and to place young boys under homosexual men 
on camping trips or face financial ruin.”75  
 
The few Democrats who opposed the bill saw no bona fide motive 
behind it. Senator Charles Robb (Democrat, Virginia) announced “I feel very 
strongly that this legislation is fundamentally wrong, and feeling as I do it 
would not be true to my conscience or my oath of office if I fail to speak out 
against it.”76 . Senator Barbara Boxer (Democrat, California) was more 
scathing. The bill was: “ugly politics. To me, it is about dividing us instead of 
bringing us together. To me, it is about scapegoating. To me, it is a diversion 
from what we should be doing.”77 Her colleague Charles Robb, a Virginia 
Democrat, was equally forthright: “I feel very strongly that this legislation is 
fundamentally wrong, and feeling as I do it would not be true to my 
conscience or my oath of office if I fail to speak out against it.”78  
 
DOMA’s supporters had accurately anticipated that States would 
begin to legalize gay marriage however. By 2013, 13 States (and Washington 
DC) had legislated to allow same-sex marriage,79 although 35 expressly 
prohibited it.80 The problem that DOMA posed for Windsor related to federal 
inheritance tax. Ms. Windsor had married her wife in Canada in 2007. When 
her wife died, Ms. Windsor was presented with a bill for federal inheritance 
tax, from which she would have been exempt had her spouse been a man. 
 
The composition of the Court had changed notably since Lawrence 
was decided. Chief Justice Roberts (Bush 2005) had replaced Rehnquist, and 
Justice Alito (Bush 2006) had taken O’Connor’s seat. Both might sensibly 
have been thought unreceptive to either the liberty or equal protection 
arguments against sexual orientation discrimination. Sonia Sotomayor (2009, 
Obama) had been appointed to the Court on David Souter’s retirement, and 
Elena Kagan (2010, Obama) took the seat vacated by John Paul Stevens. Both 
would likely be supportive of those arguments. 
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Given his judgment in Lawrence, Kennedy’s alignment with Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan in a 5- 4 judgment invalidating DOMA s.3 
was predictable. The majority’s reasoning in Kennedy’s opinion was not 
entirely compelling. Its core was the assertion that marriage was 
demonstrably a privacy right that amounted to a liberty interest under the 
Fifth Amendment. That assertion is of course uncontentious. The more 
difficult proposition to sustain is that the liberty interest in marriage is 
indifferent to the genders of the married couple. 
 
To an extent, the majority sidestepped that historically difficult 
question by focusing on the motivation that underlay DOMA. Drawing on the 
Congressional debates, Kennedy saw little scope to doubt that those motives 
were: “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that 
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) 
morality”; and to protect: “the traditional moral teaching reflected in 
heterosexual-only marriage laws”.81 This led to the conclusion that: “The 
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose 
a disadvantage, a separate status and so a stigma upon all those who enter into 
same sex marriages…”82 and that the “essence” of DOMA was: “interference 
with the equal dignity of same sex marriages”.83 The majority did not in terms 
confirm that the constitutional barrier to Congress discriminating against 
same sex marriage also meant that States could not do so, but it was hard to 
resist the conclusion that Windsor would not lead to that result. 
 
This seemed to be Scalia’s primary concern in another hyperbolic, 
almost hysterical dissent. He was manifestly unconvinced by the majority’s 
assertion that its conclusion addressed only the constitutionality of DOMA:  
In my opinion, however, the view that this Court will take of 
State prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond 
mistaking by today’s opinion… The real rationale of today’s 
opinion, whatever disappearing trail of its legalistic argle-
bargle one chooses to follow, is that DOMA is motivated by 
‘bare desire to harm’ couples in same sex marriages. 84 
Scalia saw no meaningful barrier to altering the language used in the 
majority opinion to reach embrace state laws. If DOMA humiliates same sex 
spouses by according their relationship an inferior (i.e. married only for state 
law purposes) status, then it would seem logical that state laws prohibiting 
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same-sex marriage entirely humiliates gay couples by according their 
relationships  an inferior (i.e. non-married) status. That Scalia foresaw and 
vehemently disapproved of where the majority was likely to go in a 
subsequent case dealing with state laws perhaps explains in part the vitriolic 
nature of his dissent, although as noted above his opinions in both Romer and 
Lawrence had already displayed that unhappy quality. 
 
His analytical starting point was a perfectly proper one; namely that 
the majority was overstepping the legitimate boundaries of its constitutional 
role by interfering in a political dispute that should be left to elected 
legislators to resolve. He was however unable and/or unwilling to make that 
point in a dispassionately judicial style: 
This case is about power in several respects. It is about the 
power of people to govern themselves, and the power of this 
Court to pronounce the law. Today, opinion aggrandizes the 
latter, with the predictable consequence of diminishing the 
former. We have no power to decide this case. And even if we 
did, we have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this 
democratically adopted legislation. The Court’s errors on both 
points spring forth from the same diseased roots: an exalted 
conception of the role of this institution in America.85 
There is certainly some force in Scalia’s substantive point that the majority’s 
opinion is not securely rooted in authority, although expressing that view by 
deriding the opinion as “rootless and shifting”86 might better be categorized 
as abuse rather than rebuttal. He puts his case rather better in noting that the 
majority seems not squarely to have decided if it is dealing with a rational 
basis rather than strict scrutiny standard of review. As in his earlier judgments 
however, Scalia maintained a Nelsonian blindness to the realities of the 
motives of the legislators who supported the law under challenge. He 
denounced the majority’s conclusion that the Act sprang from homophobic 
hostility as “quite untrue.”43 The assertion is bizarre in the face of the 
speeches in the Congressional Record referred to by the majority, and Scalia 
does not draw upon any part of the Congressional Record which reveals a 
“rational” basis for DOMA motivated by some more palatable concerns. He 
suggests that one rational basis for the Act would be to avoid difficult choice 
of law problems which might arise given that some States allowed same-sex 
marriage and some did not; although he is unable to show any member of 
Congress making that point during the Act’s passage. 87 
 
Scalia does eschew in Windsor however the direct demonization of 
gay activists that he indulged in both in Romer and in Lawrence. But while 
that is a welcome move towards a judgment displaying what Scalia himself 
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calls at the end of his opinion “the judicial temperament”, he counterbalances 
that move and compromises his judgment’s intellectual weight by his casual, 
caustic dismissal of Lawrence as the case that declared: “a constitutional right 
to homosexual sodomy,”89 He does not accept that the case was really about a 
right of privacy for adults of sound mind to engage in consensual, non-violent 
sexual behavior in their own homes. Homophobic bigotry does not lose its 
character just because it is expressed obliquely rather than head-on; a point of 
which Scalia was surely aware but with which he chose not to engage. 
 
 
 
G Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 
 
It took barely a year for Scalia’s prediction in Windsor to bear fruit. In 
Obergefell v. Hodges90 the Court split in just the same way as in Windsor on 
the question of whether States could indeed limit marriage to ‘heterosexual’ 
couples.91 The majority’s reasoning also followed the path laid out in 
Windsor. While some weight was accorded to an equal protection analysis, 
the judgment is based primarily on the conclusion that the right to marry is a 
liberty issue which entitles any and all adults to marry any other adult he/she 
might wish, and which liberty States could restrict only for reasons that would 
survive strict scrutiny review.92 
 
Justice Kennedy presents marriage as an evolving social phenomenon. 
This was presumably done to pre-emptively rebut the argument that the 
‘liberties’ embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment comprised only those 
things that had a longstanding empirical root in the fabric of American life; a 
quality which same-sex marriage obviously lacked:  
 …[M]arriage was once viewed as an arrangement by the 
couple’s parents based on political, religious, and financial 
concerns; but by the time of the Nation’s founding it was 
understood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a 
woman….. As the role and status of women changed, the 
institution further evolved. Under the centuries-old doctrine of 
coverture, a married man and woman were treated by the State 
as a single, male-dominated legal entity…As women gained 
legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to 
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understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law 
of coverture was abandoned…. These and other developments 
in the institution of marriage over the past centuries were not 
mere superficial changes. Rather, they worked deep 
transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage 
long viewed by many as essential….93 
This presumption of constant evolution enables the majority to assert that the 
gender identity of spouses is an ‘aspect’ - and a ‘deep’ aspect – of marriage, 
but is not an indispensable element of it. Rather its essential character may lie 
in spouses’ reciprocal desire for companionship and emotional intimacy, 
which is a quality not dependent on sexual orientation. 
 
The majority offers a similarly ‘evolutionary’ perspective on the issue 
of ‘equal dignity’ by equating the long term rejection of the subordinate status 
of women vis-à-vis men with the more recently emerging attitudinal changes 
in modern American society to homosexuality:  
 
Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been 
condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western 
nations, a belief often embodied in the criminal law. For this 
reason, among others, many persons did not deem 
homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity…. 
Same-sex intimacy remained a crime in many States…. 
 For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was 
treated as an illness….Only in more recent years have 
psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is 
both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable… 
.
94
 
  
After rooting this notion of ‘dignity’ in the 1960s contraception cases, 
Justice Kennedy then finds it having been applied, albeit not under that label, 
in three ‘marriage cases’ in which State prohibitions were invalidated. In the 
first, Loving v.Virginia,95 the Warren Court struck down Virginia’s laws 
which forbade marriage between a white and non-white person. In the second, 
Zablocki v. Redhail,96 the Burger court held that Wisconsin’s law which 
prevented fathers who defaulted on child support payments from marrying 
was unconstitutional. And in the third, Turner v. Saffley,97 the court 
invalidated a Missouri law which precluded any prison inmate from marrying 
unless the prison governor considered there were compelling reasons to allow 
the inmate to do so. Since the majority took the view – as in Romer and 
Lawrence – that the effect of laws prohibiting same sex couples from 
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marrying was to stigmatize gay people, and that their motivation was simply 
moral disapproval of homosexuality, the laws simply could not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. 
 
Scalia’s dissent is notably short in Obergefell. Equally notably, he 
seems here to underline the shift he made in Windsor in no longer demonizing 
the advocates of same-sex marriage. Indeed, he refers to them – and their 
opponents - in perfectly respectful terms. They are apparently not ‘crusaders’ 
any more: 
 
[P]ublic debate over same sex marriage displayed American 
democracy at its best. Individuals on both sides of the issue 
passionately but respectfully attempted to persuade their fellow 
citizens to accept their views. Americans considered the 
arguments and put the question to a vote… .98 
 
Silly metaphor has also been expunged from Scalia’s analysis. There is no 
suggestion of that prohibiting murder, incest or prostitution has anything 
valuable to tell us about whether we might also prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination. Indeed, there is even a suggestion that Scalia is 
acknowledging the stylistic and substantive excesses of his own opinions in 
Romer, Lawrence and Windsor: “It is one thing for separate concurring or 
dissenting opinions to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of 
thought and expression; it is something else for the official opinion of the 
Court to do so”.99  The great bulk of the opinion is however a marvelous 
example of such ‘extravagance’, taking the form of a petulant diatribe against 
the majority of the Court. The second paragraph sets the tone: 
Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 
million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine 
lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is 
the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one 
can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create 
“liberties” that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to 
mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an 
unelected committee of nine, always accompanied (as it is 
today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the 
most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of 
Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom 
to govern themselves.100 
The crux of this argument in substantive terms is of course simple. It 
is very hard credibly to view same sex marriage as a liberty in the orthodox 
Palko sense, if it is a legal status which has not been recognized by any State 
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at all until very recently and which at present is recognized only by a minority 
of them. The same problem would attend any assertion that sexual orientation 
is a suspect category for equal protection purposes. This was in essence the 
argument made in restrained terms by Chief Justice Roberts. Scalia’s brief 
opinion however is an unrelenting tirade of sarcasm and abuse:101 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has descended from 
the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph 
Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie … 
…. Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often 
profoundly incoherent. “The nature of marriage is that, 
through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other 
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.” 
(Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and spirituality 
[whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is, one 
would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than 
expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie. 
… Rights, we are told, can “rise ... from a better informed 
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a 
liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (Huh? How can a 
better informed understanding of how constitutional 
imperatives [whatever that means] define [whatever that 
means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give birth to a 
right?)… . 
… [T]o allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be 
considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly 
unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even 
more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no 
social transformation without representation… 
But what really astounds is the hubris reflected in today’s 
judicial Putsch… . 
 
There are also substantive shortcomings in Scalia’s judgment. 
Although he does not engage with the animus argument, he offers no 
explanation of why the States that prohibited same sex marriage chose to do 
so. That the relevant majorities in each State did do so is apparently all that is 
required. The main weakness in the judgment however is the way in which 
Scalia continually misrepresents the nature of ‘the People’. Scalia constantly 
equates ‘the People’ in the sense of the Article V amendment process (ie ‘the 
People’ with the power to amend the constitution) with the United States’ 
fifty geographically discrete lawmaking majorities which pass legislation or 
constitutional amendment under State constitutions. But these majorities are 
obviously not ‘the People’ in a sovereign sense. They are no more than a 
cluster of ‘mini-Peoples’, many of them comprising no more than a tiny 
minority of the true ‘People’. That ‘People’ can reverse the majority decision 
in Obergefell whenever and however it should choose to do so. A new 
amendment along the lines of: “Marriage may only be contracted between an 
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adult man and an adult woman, and no institution of the Federal government 
nor any institution of any State’s government shall recognize as valid for any 
purposes any marriage, wherever or whenever entered into, between persons 
of the same gender” would achieve that result. If that is what ‘the People’ of 
the United States want the law to be, the Obergefell majority offers no 
obstacle to them doing so. It may be in practical political terms very unlikely 
that such a majority will emerge, but that is the point of having a 
constitutional order resting on deeply entrenched laws. And of course if ‘the 
People’ had ever felt so strongly that marriage should be an exclusively 
heterosexual legal status we might wonder why that view was never made 
clear in the text of the constitution. 
 
Scalia manages to match substantive nonsense with stylistic excess in 
a section of his judgment in which he asserts that the majority are “… willing 
to say that any citizen who does not agree with that, who adheres to what was, 
until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all generations and all 
societies, stands against the Constitution.”102   
 
This is also a remarkably foolish statement. One does not “stand 
against” the Constitution by advocating that its text be changed or its 
interpretation altered. The ability to make such arguments is a basic tenet of 
the entire constitutional system. Did critics of Dred Scott or of Plessy or of 
Lochner103 “stand against” the constitution? Of course not. And neither does 
anyone who advocates constitutional amendment to forbid same-sex 
marriage, or who raises the issue again before the courts in the hope of having 
Obergefell reversed. 
 
Scalia concludes, with no apparent irony, with this criticism of the 
majority opinion: 
 
The world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or 
inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law. The 
stuff contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s 
reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.104 
 
‘Clear thinking and sober analysis’ are without doubt traits demanded of 
judges, especially those who exercise as much power as the members of the 
United States Supreme Court. It is perhaps rather a shame that those qualities 
seemed to be in such short supply in Scalia’s own judgment in this case. 
 
 
II Conclusion 
 
                                                          
102
 Id. at 2630. 
 
103
 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 567 (1896); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 
104
 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015). 
 
(2017) British Journal of American Legal Studies 
 
29 
 
Insofar as one can find a constitutionally principled rationale 
underlying Scalia’s position in this line of cases, it presumably lies in his 
insistence on the need for the Supreme Court to acknowledge and to respect 
the dividing line between law and politics (and courts and 
politicians/electorates). He – along presumably with Rehnquist, Thomas and 
Alito – evidently roots his jurisprudence firmly in the appropriate sphere of 
judicial restraint in the face of majoritarian political lawmaking, while the 
shifting majorities who have disagreed with them are abandoning the proper 
judicial role to engage in not just un- but anti- ‘democratic’ cultural 
engineering. The fascinating irony here is that a judge who eschews ‘politics’ 
produces judgments replete with substantive sentiments and styles of 
expression which fit more readily in the world of demagogic politicking than 
of dispassionate judicial analysis. The substantive analysis is shot through 
with misrepresentation of opposing argument and inapposite metaphor, while 
the style in which that substance is couched descends frequently into abuse, 
hyperbole and hysteria.  
 
Were one to search for a judicial precursor of such judgments, the 
examples that spring most readily to mind are Roger Taney’s mendacious 
misuse of original intent jurisprudence in Dred Scott v. Sandford 105 and 
James McReynolds’ splenetic dissents from the Court’s pro-New Deal and 
(timid) racial equality judgments in the 1930s.106 But perhaps a nearer 
ideological bedfellow can be found a little closer (chronologically if not 
institutionally) to home in the presidential campaign of Donald Trump. It is 
hardly a surprise that Trump joined in the ‘he was a great judge’ fanfare after 
Scalia’s death, and promised that as President he would seek to appoint 
judges in a similar mould.107 Both men persistently displayed in their 
respective legal and political spheres a disdain for the truth of their empirical 
observations and a contempt for the arguments advanced by their opponents. 
Those are unhappy qualities in a politician; they are an obscenity in a judge. 
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